The battle of Marengo on 14
June 1800 was a pivotal moment in Napoleon’s career. It was his first battle as
head of state and very nearly his last. At four o’clock in the afternoon his
army was scrambling eastward across the plain of Alessandria being pursued by a
victorious, albeit exhausted enemy. However, within two hours victory had been
snatched from the jaws of defeat in the most dramatic of comebacks. Desaix lay
slain at the head of the incomparable 9th Light Infantry, and Kellermann
had ridden into the history books placing the crown of France on Napoleon’s
head. Of course, the truth was not quite so simple . . .
Perhaps the most honest
account of Marengo was written by one of Berthier’s ADCs, a young subaltern
named Maurice Dupin. While in Turin in the weeks immediately after Marengo he
described the battle in a letter written to his uncle as only a young man in
his early twenties might:
‘Piff, paff, pouf, pow!
Forwards! Sound the charge! Retreat! Into battery! We’re lost! Victory! Every
man for himself! To the right, to the left, to the middle! Come back, stay,
leave, hurry up! Station the howitzer! At the gallop! Head’s down, here comes a
ricochet ball … The dead, the wounded, legless, arms taken off, prisoners,
baggage, horses, mules, cries of rage, shouts of victory, cries of pain, a
devilish dust, hot as hell, effing and blinding, shit, a clatter, a confusion,
a magnificent brawl: and there you have, my dear, kind uncle, in a few words, a
clear and concise view of the battle of Marengo, from which your nephew has
returned safe and sound after having been bowled over, together with his mount,
by a passing cannonball, and after having been treated by the Austrians, for
fifteen hours, to the fire of thirty pieces of artillery, twenty howitzers, and
thirty thousand muskets ...’[1]
The strength of Dupin’s
account is that it does not attempt to dissect the battle into its component
parts; but instead gives a sense of the overwhelming exhilaration he felt from
being in battle. One imagines the many thousands of young men present that day
could identify more with this colourful language than the sweeping prose of the
bulletin which attempted to make sense of the chaos and to put the events of
the day into some coherent order, whether they were completely accurate or not.
The main source book for
the French participation in Marengo is Captain de Cugnac’s Campagne de
l’armée de reserve en 1800. Published in 1900 on the centenary of the
battle, de Cugnac compiled a variety of sources found in memoirs and in
manuscripts held in the French army’s archives. While this is an excellent
starting point for anyone interested in the battle, it is not an exhaustive
record of the accounts.
The pivotal part of the
battle was the phase in the early evening when the French regained the
initiative. When I first went to Vincennes to study in the archives back in the
late 1990s one of the first dossiers I examined was a collection of manuscripts
relating to the battle most of which were reproduced by de Cugnac.[2]
Inexplicably de Cugnac did not use, or even reference, a letter written by
General of Brigade Louis Charles Guénand, commander of the second brigade of
Boudet’s division.
Guénand was a professional
career officer. Born on 22 August 1755 he was a graduate of the École Militaire
and a captain in the Navarre infantry regiment at the time of the French
Revolution. Serving in the Army of the North he was promoted to the rank of
colonel on 26 October 1792 and then provisionally made brigadier general the
following August. At this point politics made a dramatic intervention in his
career and promotional prospects. In October 1793 he was denounced as a former
noble and forced to resign. He was not reemployed until 14 March 1800 when at
the age of 44 he was given a brigade under General Boudet in the Army of the
Reserve. After Marengo, Guénand requested a posting to Belgium where he became
military commandant for the Dyle area. However soon after taking up the appointment
he fell ill, was discharged from the army and then died on 9 May 1803. He went
to his grave a disillusioned and dejected man, unable to fathom why his
prominent part in the victory at Marengo had seemingly been ignored in all the
accounts. The following account sheds light on Guénand’s state of mind after
Marengo and, more critically, gives us greater detail on the course of the
evening battle:[3]
Note for General Dumas,
I urge General Dumas not to
publish his historical essays on the battle of Marengo without having received
the notes of General Guénand on this decisive battle, as well as the campaign
of Year 8 in Italy.
At Marengo General Guénand
commanded two-thirds of the corps of Desaix, the 30th and 59th [half-brigades
of the line].[4] When his
brigade arrived on the field, all was lost excepting the small corps of cavalry
that was commanded at that moment by Kellermann, composed in the major part by
a fraction of the Guard of the Consuls.[5] The
advanced-guard and corps of the line were all in such a rout that it was
impossible for General Guénand to enter by the road that went to San Giuliano
which found itself so encumbered by the fugitives that he had to abandon it to
go forwards rapidly, crossing through the fields at this point.
When Desaix said to the 1st
Consul: ‘You must resume the battle,’ only the corps of the reserve
remained.
General Guénand, who had
developed in front of San Giuliano, began the attack of this second battle.
Overwhelming all the infantry that it had opposite it, who were entrenched up
to their teeth in the vines, which, moreover, were crowned by 35 cannons,
taking three flags, nine cannons, we finished off or took prisoner the whole of
this infantry, [then] rallied his brigade at the exit of vines to arrange it in
its original order in columns by echelon with a few battalions deployed.
He ventured onto the great
plain of Alexandria against all the Austrian cavalry supported by the infantry
and a formidable artillery, without cannons or cavalry, [and] made an audacious
drive, which alone determined Kellermann’s attack on the left flank of Zach’s
corps, as well as the withdrawal of the corps of Ott in which a battalion of my
brigade was detached and skilfully stuck terror [in them].[6] This is
the historical substance of the second battle.
General Guénand who at the
beginning of this attack received in the right groin a ball which bent nine,
six-franc coins in half and caused a bad bruise, is committed to giving the
most important and most authentic details on this great affair. He has
received, by order of 1st Consul an infinitely honourable letter from the
minister of war on his conduct at the battle of Marengo. He was received on his
return to Paris by the 1st Consul in the most flattering manner and Bonaparte
concurred verbally that General Guénand was one of those who contributed most
to the winning of the battle.
Pressed with questions by
Roederer,[7] who
marked his amazement to see in the two reports such a small mention of me when
he knew the justice I had rendered to the army and the 1st Consul, General
Berthier responded: ‘I admit that Guénand performed marvels, but if I had
expanded on his account I would have detracted from the whole of the reserve
corps’.[8]
This reply was despairing
and proves that the history of this battle still needs to be made. I will
provide all the material that you want. I give these here in haste, not having
had the time to re-read them. I asked Combel to pass these to General
Dumas by this courier while asking him at the same time for a topographical
tracing of the battle of Marengo, because it will singularly assist me in
retracing the details that must all belong to history.
Brussels, 30 Brumaire Year
10 (21 November 1801)
[signed] Guénand.
On the reverse of Guénand’s
letter we read the following note:
If the general has the time
to respond with a word to General Guénand it would oblige me greatly. I shall
take care to hand it to him – I observe to my cousin that General Guénand is an
excessively commendable man through his quality, talents and is very distinguished.
[Signed] Combel
Guénand included several
pieces to justify his claims. The first was a letter to the first consul dated
Piacenza, 6 Messidor Year 8 (25 June 1800), just eleven days after the battle.
GUENAND, General of
Brigade, Commander of Parmesan and Plaisantin to the First Consul.
I am tormented and
unfortunately I can hardly say that Bonaparte noticed me at the battle of
Marengo. I am writing this to see if you recall what might be my name, my face
and above all my bearing at the moment when I arrived on the field passing
through our fugitives to offer you my brigade in the fine order in which you
saw it arrive.
Remind yourself, please, my
general, that I commanded the 30th and 59th Line. Remind yourself above all
that in the name of my brigade that I asked both you and the unfortunate Desaix
to attack. Remind yourself of the calm with which I insisted [on this]. You
said: ‘order the attack’. I answered by my troops everything would be repaired.
Victory could not remain uncertain for long time between Melas and Bonaparte.
Two seconds later the order was given which would establish or dash my career.
One hundred paces into the
vines a ball struck me in the right groin, mutilating eleven coins, nine écus
and two double-Louis, flattened to the thickness of half a line and causing
heavy bruising which failed to stop me. At this instance General Boudet
arrived.[9] I had
soon crossed the vines. All the infantry which I found there was killed, made
prisoner or put to flight.
At the exit of the vines
the terrain offered nothing but an open plain. On our flanks there were some
houses where the enemy was taking action with a perfectly served artillery and
infantry well under cover. Opposite was a numerous cavalry in the finest order
of battle. On debouching, we had gone at least a mile beyond the rest of the
line. It was a feat of strength to rally my troops, I succeeded there beyond my
hopes and in an instant they were re-established in their original order, in
column by echelons mixed with a few battalions deployed. I never had much
anxiety about my right for there were several battalions from Monnier’s
division who were at grips with the turning wing of Ott.[10]
Despite the very lively
fire of the enemy artillery on this point, which battered my right flank, I
only directed my attention to the left which found itself very much up in the
air by the delay of the movements which had to take place on the main road. I
hesitated for a few seconds to go forward, however my party soon began with
General Boudet’s consent. I made this amazing push more than half a league
ahead of the line, and threw uncertainty and caused the Hungarian grenadiers
who were opposed to the 9th Light to wobble.[11] It was
at this moment only that Desaix could have ordered that fine charge of the
reserve cavalry on the left flank of those same Hungarian grenadiers.[12] Yes my
general, I say it from the depth of my soul, it was this audacious and
calculated move to which the outcome of the battle is in the great part due.
I do not pretend to
diminish by this the merit of the actors of that day, without doubt the most
influential of the war and on the destiny of Europe.
My reason confirms the
gestures of affection, the promotion which you have marked with the seal of
glory; but how is it that a man, the friends of whom you told would be promoted
general of division in the field, who has been a brigadier general since the 6
August 1793, that those horrible cannibals held back for five years since his
first employment; who freed by his fortune had nothing but a child who he loved
more than himself, has abandoned everything for the glory of serving his
country under the orders of heroes he admires, did not have a word, a single
word, said of him in such circumstances?
Ah! I agree, after the
battle I should have placed myself before your eyes instead of strictly staying
in bivouac with my troops. I should have known that too great a number of
things filled your head - the most capacious which has yet appeared on the face
of the world. Maybe also there was too much pride in me having been too long
kept aside.
Ah, if I have committed
this fault, it will be forgotten by Bonaparte. If as a result of the capable
people who are placed between Bonaparte and me, if they have diverted his
attention from separating out the leading actors of this great drama, he will
permit me to say to him every time: at the battle of Marengo I commanded the
30th and 59th.
Salute, etc.
After this letter, Guénand
continued his commentary to Dumas:
The 1st Consul did not give
me an answer, but Minister of War Carnot, to whom I sent a copy of the piece
took it to the 1st Consul and who read it to him from beginning to
end. Bonaparte listened with great attention, interrupting regularly the
reading to say: ‘there is no fact, no line, which is not the truth and which
does not belong to the history. Write on my behalf to General Guénand a letter
of complements in the most honourable terms on his brilliant conduct at the
battle of Marengo.’
Here follows a copy of the
letter of Minister Carnot.
The Minister of War to
General of Brigade Guénand, 12 Vendémiaire Year 9 (4 October 1800).
I pass on to you, citizen
general, a letter of the minister of foreign relations which contains
honourable testimonies of gratitude and satisfaction on the part of the two
seated powers and friends of the republic, on the subject of your conduct in
restoring tranquillity in the city of Piacenza in Prairial last.
I am pleased to take
advantage of this occasion to inform you that I put before the eyes of the
first consul the proofs of signal service that you rendered at the battle of
Marengo. The consul who read them perfectly recalled this, has charged me to
give witness of his satisfaction.
Receive at the same time
the expressions of mine: not only for the acts of bravery you pointed out to
the consul on the battle of Marengo, but also on your particular conduct in all
circumstances where it was necessary to give proofs of zeal, intelligence and
dedication. It will always be with pleasure that I will recall you to the
attention of the government when the occasion presents itself.
Could General Dumas have
thought, having these pieces of such authenticity, that one could not confide
in the veracity of this report? No, he will be grateful to me for my notes; he
will judge with all the army, that at Marengo there were on the same day two
battles; the one entirely lost and until four o’clock, the rout was so complete
that Melas announced himself in Alessandria that the French were lost. Without
any sort of resources the other was won and thus, the dispositions for which
did not begin until half past three o’clock with a handful of brave men, the
most part conscripts having four times their number to fight. I attacked at
four o’clock and fought ceaseless until one hour after nightfall. All that they
say Desaix did on the right, have the assurance that you do not have need of
this fiction. I executed it alone. Desaix had left me as soon as I received the
order to attack to go to the left on the side of Musnier with the 9th Light.
Kellermann agreed himself at Milan, in being amazed that I had not been
promoted, like him, on the battlefield, that without the impetuosity and
success of my attack he could never have made the cavalry charge. Oh well! Who
can believe neither myself nor my brigade were cited in Berthier’s report;
there is a word only in Dupont’s report. This is not the way to write the
annuals of history and General Dumas, being as good a historian as a soldier, does
me the sole reward that I aspire for; that of the glory which he justly and
honourably attaches to the names in his excellent work.
This concludes the
translation of Guénand’s account of Marengo to General Dumas. Needless to say,
not a word of it was used by Dumas in his account of Marengo which eventually
appeared in his Précis des Évènements militaires ou Essai historique sur les
Campagnes de 1799 à 1814.
The sad fact is, the
account of Marengo is far more dramatic when we follow the headlines, i.e. Desaix
and Bonaparte held a conference and decided to attack; Marmont’s artillery
opened fire; Desaix fell mortally wounded and spoke his last words to Lebrun,
the son of a noted politician; the ‘incomparable’ 9th Light revenged him by
attacking the Hungarian Grenadiers (actually ‘German’, but never mind), and
Kellermann crowned the success with a glorious cavalry charge - all arms were
involved and a famous hero of the Republic valiantly slain; what more could a
story want?
To have continued the
narrative, explaining that after the surrender of Zach’s advanced guard, there
was still another four or five hours of hard fighting in order for the French
to resume their morning positions, was an unnecessary detail which would have
muddied the prose of a dramatic account telling of victory being clutched from
the jaws of defeat.
However, the account is
useful to us today for a number of reasons. The second battle appears far more
chaotic; far more fluid, than standard accounts suggest, with Austrians hidden
in the vines, with massed artillery and large formations of cavalry charging
into the infantry formations. It shows that Guénand’s arrival had an impact on
the action between the 9th Light and Zach’s grenadiers, if only that the
arrival of a French brigade on their left threw the grenadiers into confusion
just prior to being hit by Kellermann.
Smaller details include the
formation employed by Guénand’s brigade: ‘in columns by echelon with a few
battalions deployed’. Guénand is typically shown in the ‘mixed order’ formation
popularised by Chandler and others to demonstrate the basic tactical French
formation. Unusually, Guénand’s brigade was only composed of five battalions as
one battalion of the 30th Line was serving with the army of Italy. We can
assume by his description, that his battalions were initially formed (right to
left) column, line, column, line, column. However, the interesting piece is the
description ‘by echelon’. When Guénand gave the order to advance the right hand
battalion would have advanced first; typically after one hundred paces, the
second battalion would begin to advance, followed in turn by the others with a
similar interval between them (the battalions in line formation would have
formed closed column in order to pass through broken ground – Guénand confirmed
he had to restore his original formation on exiting the vines). Thus Guénand’s
brigade would have had a diagonal appearance, the right battalion up to five
hundred paces ahead of the left most battalion:
XXXX
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Another interesting point
is the conversation with Kellermann after the battle in Milan, where the two
generals, both at brigadier level, appear to have found solace in one another’s
company – Kellermann famously being upset at not being promoted after his charge.
Guénand’s account corroborates the claim Kellermann was indeed unhappy with
what he perceived as a snub.
It also appears Guénand
witnessed the famous council of war held by Bonaparte after Desaix’s arrival.
He clearly states Desaix ‘told’ the first consul to attack. On hearing this we
learn Guénand offered to lead the assault with his brigade.
Another interesting point
is Guénand mentions Desaix ordering Kellermann’s charge. In the 1820s
Kellermann and Desaix’s ADC at Marengo, Savary waged a veritable war of words
on this subject, with Kellermann claiming not to have received an order to
charge and that the initiative was solely his.
Perhaps the most important
piece of information in the document is ‘where’ the battle took place. Many
accounts say the battle occurred in front of San Giuliano; I have always
suspected it took place much further forward, level with Cascina Grossa.
Guénand says his brigade advanced beyond San Giuliano and then deployed.
However, at the point he comes into contact with the grenadier’s fighting the
9th Light, he variously describes himself being a mile or half a league in
front of the army. This places the evening battle much further west than the
standard accounts allow; it also perhaps explains the reason for the 9th Light
receiving the title ‘incomparable’ after the battle. They were already well in
advance of the army and fighting alone well before Guénand advanced. Their
attack bought Guénand time to deploy his brigade and for the rest of the army
to regroup.
So in conclusion, this
paper at least grants Guénand his wish of recognition, albeit two hundred years
late. Clearly his five infantry battalions were in the thick of the action for
a long period of time and they have been overlooked: all the more reason for a
full account of Marengo to be written.
Notes:
[1]
[Translation ©T.E. Crowdy 2013; original text from Albert Le Roy’s Georges
Sand et son amis (Paris : P. Ollendorff, 1903) p.7]
[2] See the
dossier at S.H.D. MR610.
[3] Note on
this translation: the original document gives the impression of being hurriedly
written; it is rambling (if not melodramatic), poorly punctuated and proper
nouns are often misspelt, i.e. Maringo, for Marengo; Hoot, for Ott; Zaac, for
Zach; Dessaix, for Desaix, etc. I have corrected the names and added
punctuation where necessary. Where Guénand underlined certain passages, I have
retained this emphasis.
[4]
Technically speaking, Desaix’s corps also included Monnier’s division. Here
Guénand refers only to Boudet’s division, which was detached on the evening of
13 June.
[5] In fact
the guard cavalry was under the command of Murat and led by Bessières. The
guard cavalry took no part in Kellermann’s attack.
[6] Zach
commanded the Austrian advanced guard located on the main Alessandria road, to
the left of Guénand’s brigade. Ott commanded a column of Austrian troops which
were on the French right flank, marching more or less level with Zach. This
body of troops had engaged the infantry of the Consular Guard before Desaix’s arrival.
[7] Pierre
Louis Roederer (1754-1835); a noted politician, economist and historian who
supported Bonaparte’s ‘Brumaire’ coup in 1799.
[8] Berthier
would have had some inkling of Guénand’s actions through Boudet’s report. In
his journal of operations we read the following description of the action
Guénand’s brigade took part in: ‘My second brigade, composed of the 30th and
59th Half-Brigade and directed by me, drove in with a surprising audacity,
strength and speed, the centre of the enemy army and cut it in two. This
brigade had to continually defend itself at the same time on its flanks and
rear against artillery, musketry and different corps of cavalry. The latter
particularly came at the charge several times to attack our rear; but the
perfect order of our closed columns in which our battalions remained, although
crossing vineyards and other obstacles, not only rendered the attempt of this
cavalry useless, but caused it a considerable loss. The resistance of the enemy
in certain positions was terrible. One might have amused oneself uselessly
trying to drive them away by musketry. Bayonet charges were the only way to
drive them away and these were executed with a swiftness and fearlessness
without example. Undoubtedly we cannot give enough eulogies to this brigade,
partially composed of conscripts who competed in courage and in firmness with
the oldest soldiers. In the bayonet charge, two flags were taken, one by
citizen Coqueret, captain of grenadiers of the 59th, and the other by citizen
Georges Amptil, fusilier and conscript of the 30th Half-Brigade, who pursued
and killed he who carried it and seized it in view of a platoon which looked to
take it back.’ Translation
©T.E. Crowdy 2013.
[9] At the
beginning of the action, Boudet had been with Musnier’s brigade, which was
composed of the 9th Light Infantry. After his conference with Bonaparte, Desaix
joined Musnier’s brigade and ordered Boudet to rendezvous with Guénand’s
brigade and to pierce the enemy centre, breaking it with enough rapidity to
separate Zach’s advanced guard with the Austrian left wing under Ott. [See
Boudet’s Rapport des marches et opérations de la division Boudet].
[10] Two
battalions of the 72nd Line had been left in reserve by General Monnier. These
joined Boudet’s forces in the evening counterattack. Presumably they fought on
the right of Guénand’s brigade. [See Monnier’s report in de Cugnac].
[11] The 9th
Light were already engaged against Zach, on the main road, far in advance of
the army.
[12] Guénand
speculates here. Desaix was probably dead by the time Guénand intervened.
